Welcome to my website!
I am an Assistant Professor in the Coller School of Management at Tel Aviv University.
I am interested in Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organisation, and Behavioral Economics.
My CV can be found here.
Two-Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, 7(3), 241-258.
We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents' preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Specifically, when an agent's action expresses that he wishes to be matched with an agent on the other side of the market, this will affect the latter agent's preferences. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e.g. the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that result in matchings which are not stable w.r.t the agents' endogenous preferences. However, when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is modified such that women are only allowed to state their first choice, every equilibrium of its induced game results in a pairwise stable matching w.r.t the endogenous preferences as long as they satisfy a natural reciprocity property. Moreover, in the conventional setup, in which agents' preferences are exogenous, the modified mechanism preserves the classic properties of the Gale-Shapley mechanism.
No One Likes to Be Second Choice. Economic Journal, 2018, Forthcoming.
A decision‐maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision‐maker's preference list. However, the decision‐maker's preferences are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision‐maker's preference list from information revealed by the number of failed offers. I explore the adverse effect of the social component in the candidates’ preferences on the decision maker's ability to recruit a suitable candidate.
Multilevel Marketing: Pyramid-Shaped Schemes or Exploitative Scams?
We identify the conditions on the tendency of agents to spread information by word of mouth, under which a principal can design a pyramid scam to exploit a network of agents whose beliefs are coarse. We find that a pyramid scam is sustainable only if its underlying reward scheme compensates the participants on multiple levels of recruitments (e.g., for recruiting new members and for recruitments made by these new members). Motivated by the growing discussion on the legitimacy of multilevel marketing schemes and their resemblance to pyramid scams, we compare the two phenomena based on their underlying compensation structure.